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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Roland F. L. Hall'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys decisions addressing appellate law and procedure
handed down by the Georgia Court of Appeals between June 1, 2009 and
May 31, 2010.1 The cases discussed fall into the following categories:
(1) appellate jurisdiction; (2) preserving the record; and (3) miscellaneous
cases of interest.
II.

APPELLATE JuRSDICTIoN

Selecting the CorrectAppeal Procedure
As can be seen from the cases discussed below, it is not always easy
to decide which appeal procedure should be used. In Owens v. Green
1)ee Servicing LLC, 2 a dispossessory action, the defendant appealed
from the trial court's issuance of a writ of dispossession and contended
that the trial court erred when it rejected his defense of wrongful
foreclosure. The defendant filed a separate appeal from the trial court's
order requiring him to pay rent into the registry of the court pending
resolution of the first appeal.'
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order in the
first appeal in part because the defendant failed to include a trial

A.

* Partner in the firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994); Senior Managing
Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
1. For analysis of Georgia appellate practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Roland F. L. Hall, Appellate Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 31 (2009).
2. 300 Ga. App. 22, 684 S.E.2d 99 (2009).
3. Id. at 22-23, 684 S.E.2d at 100.
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transcript in the record.' However, the more interesting point was
raised in the second appeal, in which the plaintiff argued that the
defendant was required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures
that required the defendant to pay rent pending appeal.s The court of
appeals held that the cases cited by the plaintiffs on this point were
inapposite because in those cases "the appeal was from an order
directing [a] tenant to pay rent pending the disposition of the dispossessory case.'" In Owens the issue of dispossession had already been
decided, and the payment of rent pending appeal was ordered pursuant
to a post-judgment order.'
The court of appeals held that a post-judgment order that requires
payment of rent pending appeal is similar to a post-judgment order that
requires the posting of a supersedeas bond and is subject to direct
appeal.9 The court of appeals ultimately dismissed the second appeal
as moot in light of its disposition of the first appeal.'o
In 'brres v. Piedmont Builders, Inc.," after the property owners
became involved in a dispute with their homebuilder, they filed a motion
with the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia for appointment of
an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. Although the owners argued that
the construction contract neither specified the arbitrator nor any
procedure for selecting one, the superior court dismissed the action and
ordered that the arbitration be administered by an arbitration firm
named in the contract. After the owners filed a direct appeal, the
homebuilder argued that the appeal should be dismissed for failure to
follow the interlocutory appeal procedures.12
The homebuilder relied on prior cases holding that the grant of a
motion to compel arbitration cannot be directly appealed under section
5-6-34(a)(4) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)" and
must be appealed under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)" using the applicable

4.
5.
6.
T..B.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 23-24, 684 S.E.2d at 100-01.
Id at 24, 684 S.E.2d at 101.
Carter v. Landel/Arundel, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 115, 322 S.E.2d 108 (1984); Wall v.
Servs., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 437, 233 S.E.2d 810 (1977).
Owens, 300 Ga. App. at 24, 684 S.E.2d at 101.
Id.
Id. at 24-25, 684 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 25, 684 S.E.2d at 101.
300 Ga. App. 872, 686 S.E.2d 464 (2009).
Id. at 872, 686 S.E.2d at 465.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(aX4) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Id. § 5-6-34(b).
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interlocutory appeal procedures."
However, the court of appeals
distinguished those cases because they did not involve final judgments."e The court held that the appeal arose from a final order that
dismissed the owners' initial action in its entirety." Under O.C.GA.
§ 5-6-34(a)(1),"s the appeal was from a final judgment and was therefore directly appealable."
In In the Interest of J.N.," a case involving deprivation proceedings
concerning two juveniles, an order was entered terminating a plan for
reunification of the children with the parents and placing the children
in the custody of relatives. The juveniles' biological father petitioned for
modification of the order, requesting that the children be immediately
transferred into his custody or that he be awarded regular visitation.
The juvenile court denied the petition, and the father filed a direct
appeal.'
The court of appeals first considered whether the father had the right
to file a direct appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11),2 which
allows a direct appeal from all child custody case judgments or orders.2
It was determined to be unclear whether the phrase "child custody
cases" included child deprivation proceedings when the juvenile court
entered a child custody order.' While the court noted that a deprivation proceeding may require child custody determinations, it also stated
that the primary purpose of such a proceeding is to determine whether
the child is deprived rather than to determine child custody issues.2
Thus, the court concluded that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) does not
authorize a direct appeal.26
However, the court of appeals did hold that pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 56-34(a)(1) and 15-11-3,27 the juvenile court's order was a final judgment; thus, it was directly appealable.' Section 15-11-3 provides that

15. Torres, 300 Ga. App. at 872, 686 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting Pace Constr. Corp. v.
Northpark Assocs., 215 Ga. App. 438, 439, 450 S.E.2d 828, 829 (1994)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 872, 686 S.E.2d at 465-66.
18. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(aXl) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
19. Torres, 300 Ga. App. at 872-73, 686 S.E.2d at 466.
20. 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010).
21. Id. at 631, 691 S.E.2d at 397.
22. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(aXll) (Supp. 2009).
23. Id.; In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 631-32, 691 S.E.2d at 397-98.
24. In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 632, 691 S.E.2d at 398 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 632-33, 691 S.E.2d at 398.
27. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3 (2008).
28. In the Interestof J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 634, 691 S.E.2d at 399.
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appeals from a final judgment of a juvenile court "shall be taken to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same manner as appeals
from the superior court," while § 5-6-34(a)(1) provides that all final
judgments of a superior court are by direct appeal." The court of
appeals concluded that the juvenile court order placing the children in
the long-term custody of relatives clearly constituted a final order from
which a direct appeal could have been taken.3 ' As a result, the juvenile
court's order denying the father's petition to modify the final order in
that proceeding was itself a final order from which a direct appeal could
be taken." The court overruled its decision in In the Interest of
B.S.H."3 to the extent it held otherwise.'
In that case, the court
stated that an appeal from an O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b)' motion was only
available by application.86
In In the Interest of J.L.K," a juvenile who was determined to be
delinquent by the Lowndes County, Georgia Juvenile Court filed two
separate motions for reconsideration, modification, or vacatur of the
orders entered regarding his disposition. The juvenile court denied both
motions, and the juvenile filed a direct appeal from the denial of the
second motion.' The court of appeals initially considered whether it
had jurisdiction over the appeal.'
On appeal, the juvenile argued that the juvenile court should have set
aside the order on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(a)(3), 0 which allows
a juvenile court order to be set aside if such is required by newly
discovered evidence."' The juvenile also argued that the order should
have been set aside on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70(d),42 which
allows the juvenile court to terminate an order of disposition of a child
determined to be delinquent if the purposes of the order have been
accomplished.'

29. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3.
30. O.C.GA § 5-6-34(aX).
31. In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 634, 691 S.E.2d at 399.
32. Id.
33. 236 Ga. App. 879, 514 S.E.2d 70 (1999).
34. In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 634, 691 S.E.2d at 399.
35. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (2008).
36. In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. at 634, 691 S.E.2d at 399 (quoting In the
Interest of B.S.H., 236 Ga. App. at 882, 514 S.E.2d at 73).
37. 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010).
38. Id. at 844, 691 S.E.2d at 893.
39. Id.
40. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(a)(3).
41. Id.; In the Interest of J.L.K, 302 Ga. App. at 846, 691 S.E.2d at 894.
42. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70(d) (2008).
43. Id.; In the Interest of J.L.K, 302 Ga. App. at 845-46, 691 S.E.2d at 894.
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The court of appeals noted that in at least one prior opinion, it had
held that an appeal from a denial of an O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40 motion must
be made pursuant to the discretionary appeal procedures," although
that portion of the opinion was subsequently overruled by its decision in
In the Interest of J.N.a In addition, the court of appeals recognized
that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)," the statute governing discretionary appeals,
does not specifically list O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-40 or 15-11-70 as being
subject to the discretionary appeal procedures.
The court of appeals then considered whether an order denying a
motion to modify a final delinquency determination under O.C.GA.
§§ 15-11-40 or 15-11-70 is a final judgment or an interlocutory judgment
because a direct appeal can only be taken from a final judgment." As
discussed above, the court of appeals had recently held in In the Interest
of J.N. that a juvenile court's order denying a motion seeking a
modification based on changed circumstances was a directly appealable
final judgment." In the case at hand, the court of appeals held that
the same rule should apply to the juvenile court's order and that the
order was a final judgment that was thus directly appealable.o
In Owens v. St. Victor," an action for breach of contract and fraud
against corporate defendants and an individual defendant, the individual
defendant's wife filed a motion for invocation by a third party seeking to
express her interest in the case. The trial court entered an order
striking and dismissing the answer of two of the corporate defendants
and all their other pleadings. The trial court subsequently denied the
wife's motion for invocation by a third party, and the wife and the
individual defendant appealed."
The court of appeals held that because the case was still pending for
all the defendants when the notice of appeal was filed, a direct appeal
While the trial court decided to strike the
was not authorized.'
corporate defendants' answers, it had not entered a final judgment as to

44. In the Interest of J.L.K, 302 Ga. App. at 846, 691 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting In the
Interest of B.S.H., 236 Ga. App. at 882, 514 S.E.2d at 73).
45. Id. (citing In the Interest of J.N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 399).
46. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (1995 & Supp. 2010).
47. In the Interest ofJ.L.K, 302 Ga. App. at 846,691 S.E.2d at 894; see O.C.GA. § 5-635(a).
48. In the Interest of J.L.K, 302 Ga. App. at 846, 691 S.E.2d at 894.
49. Id. at 847, 691 S.E.2d at 895 (citing In the Interest ofJ.N., 302 Ga. App. at 634, 691
S.E.2d at 399).
50. Id.
51. 300 Ga. App. 302, 684 S.E.2d 423 (2009).
52. Id. at 302, 684 S.E.2d at 423.
53. Id. at 302-03, 684 S.E.2d at 424.
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those defendants or the individual defendant." The court of appeals
held that because the appellants failed to follow the required interlocutory appeal procedures, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.55
In CoastalMarshlandsProtectionCommittee v. AltamahaRiverkeeper,

Inc.,' the defendant, Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee, issued
a permit to a developer to build a dock over state-owned marshlands,
and the plaintiff, Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc., challenged the defendant's
decision before an administrative law judge (AL). The ALJ affirmed
the issuance of the permit, and the plaintiff subsequently sought review
of the decision in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, which
reversed the AL's decision and remanded for rehearing. In the first
appeal, the defendant challenged the superior court's reversal of the
AL's decision. In the second appeal, the intervenors, banks that had
foreclosed on the developer's property, also appealed the superior court's
decision." In both cases the appellants obtained a certificate of
immediate review and followed the interlocutory appeal procedures. 8
The court of appeals discussed the superior court's conclusion that the
ALJ improperly restricted the manner in which the plaintiff could meet
its burden of proof in challenging the permit and remanded the case for
rehearing before the ALJ. The court then held that because returning
the case to the ALJ required reconsideration of the issue under a
different standard rather than recommencement of the agency proceedings, the order was not final.' Because the order was not final and
was thus not appealable, the court of appeals held that it lacked
jurisdiction over both appeals.6 '
B. Miscellaneous JurisdictionalIssues

In In the Interest of AC., 62 the Fulton County, Georgia Juvenile
Court ordered the termination of the parental rights of a juvenile's
parents.' The father filed an application for discretionary appeal with
the court of appeals in which he, for the first time, raised a constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(12)," which had been amended to
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 303, 684 S.E.2d at 424.
Id.
304 Ga. App. 1, 695 S.E.2d 273 (2010).
Id. at 1, 695 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 3, 695 S.E.2d at 275.
Id.
Id. at 3-4, 695 S.E.2d at 276.
Id. at 4, 695 S.E.2d at 276.
285 Ga. 829, 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009).
Id. at 831-32, 686 S.E.2d at 637.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aX12) (Supp. 2009).
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require that appeals from orders terminating parental rights be by
The court of appeals
application rather than by direct appeal.'
transferred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court."
The supreme court initially noted that it generally would not rule on
a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute when the issue has not
been raised in the trial court.67 The court then acknowledged that
there is a limited exception to this general rule when a constitutional
challenge to a statute governing appellate procedure is necessarily first
raised on appeal." The court decided to address the father's constitutional challenge pursuant to the exception" and stated that this
"narrow departure from the general rule governing a constitutional
challenge is justified because the statute of appellate procedure at issue
comes into play only when an adverse ruling below is obtained and the
dissatisfied party determines to pursue an appeal."7 0 The supreme
court also expressly overruled In the Interest of D.R.,n in which the
court of appeals held that because a parent's constitutional challenge to
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(12) was not raised or ruled upon in the trial court,
it was not reviewable on appeal." The supreme court then addressed
the constitutional challenge but ultimately rejected it.73

In Spurlock v. Department of Human Resources,' the father sought

a modification of child support. The Department of Human Resources
(DHR) recommended a reduction of the father's child-support payments,
but the trial court only ordered a portion of the recommended reduction.
The court of appeals granted the father's application for discretionary
appeal and then transferred the case to the supreme court based on the
supreme court's divorce and alimony jurisdiction.
The supreme court first considered whether an order for modification
of child support arising from a DHR review under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 7
fell under its divorce and alimony jurisdiction." The court noted that

65. Id.; In the Interest ofA.C., 285 Ga. at 832, 686 S.E.2d at 637.
66. In the Interest of AC., 285 Ga. at 832, 686 S.E.2d at 637.
67. Id. at 832, 686 S.E.2d at 638.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 833, 686 S.E.2d at 638.
70. Id. at 832-33, 686 S.E.2d at 638.
71. 298 Ga. App. 774, 681 S.E.2d 218 (2009).
72. In the Interest of AC., 285 Ga. at 833 n.3, 686 S.E.2d at 638 n.3 (citing In the
Interest of D.R., 298 Ga. App. at 782, 681 S.E.2d at 225).
73. Id. at 833-34, 686 S.E.2d at 639.
74. 286 Ga. 512, 690 S.E.2d 378 (2010).
75. Id. at 512, 690 S.E.2d at 380.
76. O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 (2010).
77. Spurlock, 286 Ga. at 512, 690 S.E.2d at 380.
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a child support award made in a divorce proceeding always constitutes
alimony, but outside of the divorce context, the award might not
represent alimony.' The court also noted that it frequently exercises
its jurisdiction in divorce and alimony cases brought under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-1979 for modification of child support awarded in a divorce decree
and in actions arising from DHR's review under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 of
awards of child support originally awarded in a divorce decree." The
court concluded that it had jurisdiction because "appeals from orders in
proceedings for modification of a child support award which arose from
a prior divorce or alimony action, regardless of the code section under
which the modification was pursued, are subject to the jurisdiction of
this Court."8'
Justice Nahmias raised an interesting point in his special concurrence,
which was joined by two other justices." He contended that not a
single court of competent jurisdiction had ever granted the father's
discretionary appeal application because the court of appeals purported
grant of the appeal occurred before the court realized that it lacked
jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the supreme court.' After
the transfer, the supreme court denied the mother's motion to dismiss
without explanation.'
Justice Naihmias noted that in some cases the supreme court simply
decided the case without addressing the application, while in others the
court issued unpublished orders directing that the correct procedure is
to strike and re-docket the transferred appeal as an application to be
granted or denied by the supreme court." Justice Nahmias argued
that the court should strike the transferred, granted appeal, re-docket
the appeal, and announce its own decision on the application," while
the majority held that such a procedure was unnecessary because the
court had implicitly determined that the application for appeal was
properly granted." Justice Nahmias insisted that any such implicit
determination that an application was granted properly "by a court with
no authority to do so ...

disregards the constitutional limits and

78. Id. at 513, 690 S.E.2d at 380.
79. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
80. Spurlock, 286 Ga. at 513, 690 S.E.2d at 380.
81. Id. at 514, 690 S.E.2d at 381.
82. Id. at 517, 690 S.E.2d at 383 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially). Justices Hines
and Melton joined the special concurrence. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 522, 690 S.E.2d at 386.
86. Id. at 519-20, 690 S.E.2d at 384.
87. Id. at 514, 690 S.E.2d at 381 (majority opinion).
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statutory requirements that are supposed to govern the authority of
judges in a democratic system" and might actually delay certain appeals,
causing unnecessary additional litigation expenses.88
Justice Nahmias also noted that the majority's procedure raised
another question of jurisdiction because the father's application for
discretionary appeal was fied in the wrong court and not docketed in
the supreme court before the thirty-day deadline under O.C.G.A. § 5-635(d)8' had expired." Justice Nahmias stated,
[T]his Court and the Court of Appeals have routinely-and correctly,
in my view-considered and decided on the merits applications that
were transferred by the other appellate court more than 30 days after
the entry of the trial court's order. The Court should also take this
jurisdictional issue out of the shadows of undiscussed practice into the
light of a published and binding opinion.e"
III.

PRESERVING THE RECORD

During every survey period, there are cases that demonstrate the
critical importance of making a complete record in the trial court. In
Thompson v. Princell," an action for dental malpractice, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant dentist failed to disclose the risks and
alternatives to the surgery in accordance with O.C.GA. § 31-9-6.1," the
informed consent statue, which governs certain medical procedures."
The jury found in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff contended on
appeal that the trial court erred when it refused to give the plaintiff's
proposed charge on the informed consent statute.9
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the statutory definition of general
anesthesia under O.C.G.A. § 43-11-1(7)r supported a charge on the
informed consent statute." The court of appeals held that because the
plaintiff did not request a written charge on the statutory definition and
never raised the statute's applicability at the charge conference, the
plaintiff had waived the argument for purposes of appeal." The court

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 517-18, 690 S.E.2d at 383 (Nalunias, J., concurring specially).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Spurlock, 286 Ga. at 525, 690 S.E.2d at 387-88 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 526, 690 S.E.2d at 388.
304 Ga. App. 256, 696 S.E.2d 91 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1 (2009).
Id.
Thompson, 304 Ga. App. at 256, 696 S.E.2d at 93.
O.C.G.A. § 43-11-1(7) (2008).
Thompson, 304 Ga. App. at 258-59, 696 S.E.2d at 93-94.
Id. at 259, 696 S.E.2d at 95.
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of appeals ultimately held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a charge
addressing the informed consent statute."
The timing requirements for objecting to submitted jury charges are
different from those for objecting to the court's failure to give a
For example, in Tucker Nursing Center, Inc. v.
requested charge."
Mosby,o' the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court's jury
instruction on the "eggshell" plaintiff and concurrent negligence
constituted error. Although the defendant only made general objections
after the charges were given to the jury, the defendant contended that
it had made specific objections to the charges at the charge conference." The court of appeals stated that "objections to charges must
be made after the jury is charged and before the verdict; objections made
at charging conferences before the charge is given do not preserve
charging issues for appellate review."'o The court also noted that
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(a),2" general objections to jury charges
are insufficient to preserve such objections for review."*
The defendant might still have preserved its objection to the charges
for review if it had requested that the charge conference be recorded or
transcribed."' The court of appeals raised the possibility that the
objection could have been preserved if the "trial court had knowledge of
the specific arguments that were presented during the charge conference, thus giving him the necessary insight to rule intelligently on the
However, because
general objections posed following the charge."'
that it could
court
concluded
the
there was no record of the conference,
8
on
appeal.o
objections
defendant's
not consider the
In Christie v. Rainmaster Irrigation,Inc.,'" another case addressing
jury charges, the plaintiff contractor brought suit against the defendant
property owner in connection with installation of a commercial irrigation
system. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the

99. Id. at 260, 696 S.E.2d at 95.
100. See, e.g., Tucker Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Mosby, 303 Ga. App. 80, 87,692 S.E.2d 727,
733 (2010).
101. 303 Ga. App. 80, 692 S.E.2d 727 (2010).
102. Id. at 87, 692 S.E.2d at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (quoting Christie v. Rainmaster Irrigation, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 383, 387, 682
S.E.2d 687, 691 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(a) (1995).
105. See Tucker Nursing Cr., Inc., 303 Ga. App. at 87, 692 S.E.2d at 733.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 299 Ga. App. 383, 682 S.E.2d 687 (2009).
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defendant for compensatory damages and attorney fees.1 o Upon the
defendant's appeal from the verdict and judgment, the court of appeals
held that the defendant had failed to take the proper steps to preserve
many of its arguments for review."' Specifically, although the defendant asserted that the trial court failed to give jury charges on certain
issues, the defendant failed to raise any objection after the jury was
charged."12
While the court of appeals ultimately based its holding on the rule
that objections made at the charging conference are not sufficient to
preserve charging issues for appeal, the court noted that "[iun any event,
As noted in Tucker
the trial conference was not transcribed.""'
Nursing Center, it is possible that if the defendant in Christie had raised
objections during the charging conference, and if that conference had
been reported and made part of the record, the trial court could have
construed those objections as continuing objections and considered them
on appeal."'
In Armstrong v. Rapson,xi5 a medical malpractice action against the
defendant surgeon and his professional corporation, the trial court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment."6 In its order,
the trial court indicated that it relied upon the complete appellate record
in making its decision."' The defendants appealed the trial court's
denial of their motion for summary judgment." 8
The defendants' notice of appeal was not in the form required under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-371" because it designated the items to be included in
the record rather than designating the portions of the record to be
omitted on appeal.12 However, upon reviewing the trial court's record,
the court of appeals determined that the defendants had failed to include
several items that the trial court might have relied upon in reaching its
decision, such as several depositions that had been filed. 2 ' Because

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 383-84, 682 S.E.2d at 689.
Id. at 386, 682 S.E.2d at 690-91.
Id. at 386-87, 682 S.E.2d at 691.
Id. at 386-87 & n.2, 682 S.E.2d at 691 & n.2.
303 Ga. App. at 87, 692 S.E.2d at 733.
299 Ga. App. 884, 683 S.E.2d 915 (2009).
Id. at 884, 683 S.E.2d at 916.
Id. at 885, 683 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 884, 683 S.E.2d at 916.
O.C.GA § 5-6-37 (1995).
Armstrong, 299 Ga. App. at 884, 683 S.E.2d at 916; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37.
Armstrong, 299 Ga. App. at 884-85, 683 S.E.2d at 916.
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evidence was omitted from the appellate record, the court of appeals held
that it was required to affirm the order denying summary judgment.122
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS

2

In Jackson v. State, ' after the court of appeals affirmed the denial
of an inmate's "motion to vacate void judgment with respect to his ...
convictions," the inmate sought to file a motion for reconsideration.'
Although the inmate had notified the clerk of the court of appeals of his
new address, the clerk continued to send mail to his old address,
including the opinion of the court of appeals. Consequently, the deadline
for filing the motion passed before the defendant received the opinion.
The clerk acknowledged the error, noted that the court of appeals had
already issued the remittitur to the trial court, and stated that the
inmate could petition for writ of certiorari, requesting that the supreme
court remand the case to the appellate court with instructions to recall
the remittitur.m
The supreme court raised several interesting points. The court
initially noted that the inmate's petition for certiorari was untimely
under Georgia Supreme Court Rule 12'26 and 38(2)121 and would
ordinarily have been dismissed.? However, the court decided that
because the deadline was required by its court rules and not by statute,
it would exercise its discretion to make an exception to its deadlines. 129
In considering whether the court of appeals could have recalled the
remittitur, the supreme court observed that prior case law suggested
that neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court has the
authority to recall a remittitur once issued, 3 1 although there was
contrary authority as well."3 ' The court also noted that the power to
recall a remittitur is well established in the federal courts. 32 Stating
that "the authority of an appellate court to recall the remittitur, or
mandate as it is called in the federal system, is an accepted feature of

122. Id. at 884, 885, 683 S.E.2d at 916, 917.
123. 286 Ga. 407, 688 S.E.2d 351 (2010).
124. Id. at 407, 688 S.E.2d at 352.
125. Id.
126. GA. Sup. CT. R. 12.
127. GA. SuP. CT. R. 38(2).
128. Jackson, 286 Ga. at 407, 688 S.E.2d at 352-53 (citing GA. SUP. CT. R. 12, 38(2)).
129. Id. at 407-08, 688 S.E.2d at 353.
130. Id. at 408,688 S.E.2d at 353 (citing Hagan v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 222 Ga. 469,
470, 150 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1966)).
131. Id. (citing David G. Brown, P.E., Inc. v. Kent, 274 Ga. 849, 849, 561 S.E.2d 89,90
(2002); Hawk v. W. & A.R. Co., 146 Ga. 373, 373, 91 S.E.2d 115, 115 (1917)).
132. Id. (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549 (1998)).
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modem appellate practice," the supreme court held that "this Court and
the Court of Appeals have the power to recall the remittitur."13
In this survey period, the court of appeals issued several decisions in
which it imposed substantial penalties for filing frivolous appeals and
violating its rules. In Farrv. Rice,'" the plaintiff, the guarantor of
promissory notes on which the defendant borrowers had defaulted,
sought indemnification from the defendants for payment of a judgment
obtained against the plaintiff by the defendants' lender. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, who was the stepmother of
one of the defendants. The defendants appealed from the trial court's
judgment. 35 The defendants had not made any payments toward the
principal amount due, yet they argued on appeal that "the principal
payments ...

on the promissory notes were not really 'past due.'"ise

The court of appeals held that the defendants failed to identify any
possible defense to their liability for the notes or their failure to
3
Thus, as a frivolous appeal penalty
reimburse the guarantor."
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6,' the court of appeals ordered the
defendants to pay the plaintiff 10% of the $1.3 million judgment
amount. 189
The case of Ferdinandv. City of East Point1o arose from a collection
agreement under which Fulton County (County) and its Tax Commissioner agreed to bill and collect ad valorem taxes on behalf of the City
of East Point (City), with the County receiving 1% of the amount
collected as its compensation. The County deducted nearly $3 million
from the amount it remitted to the City pursuant to the agreement to
fund the County's settlement of a refund claim by AT&T Communications (AT&T). The County's settlement agreement with AT&T required
the County to obtain the settlement funds from various political entities
in the County, including the City. The County and its Tax Board and
Tax Commissioner brought an interpleader action against the City and
AT&T, and the City brought counterclaims against the County for
breach of the collection agreement. The City ultimately entered into a

133. Id.
134. 300 Ga. App. 247, 684 S.E.2d 370 (2009).
135. Id. at 247-48, 684 S.E.2d at 371.
136. Id. at 248, 684 S.E.2d at 371.
137. Id.
138. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 (1995). The statute provides that the appellate court may award
10% damages "upon any judgment for a sum certain which has been affrmed" when in the
opinion of the court the appeal was taken solely for purposes of delay. Id.
139. Farr,300 Ga. App. at 248, 684 S.E.2d at 372.
140. 301 Ga. App. 333, 687 S.E.2d 617 (2009).
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consent order, which resulted in distribution of the interpleaded fund but
left the City free to pursue its counterclaim."'
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the City in 2005,
finding that the County breached the agreement by deducting the money
for the AT&T settlement from the City's tax proceeds. In 2006 the trial
court issued a final judgment that awarded nearly $3 million to the
City.142 In the initial appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment on the issue of liability but remanded to the trial court
to allow the parties full opportunity to address the issue of damages."
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in the City's
favor for the withheld tax revenue plus interest.'"
In the second appeal from the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, the City moved for frivolous appeal damages and penalties
against the County."" The City's motion requested 10% damages
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6, which provides that the appellate court
may award 10% damages "upon any judgment for a sum certain which
has been affirmed.""e The court of appeals held that it had already
confirmed the County's liability pursuant to the collection agreement, it
was undisputed that the amount in question was withheld from the tax
revenues remitted to the City, and the arguments on appeal were
The court of appeals concluded that the appeal was
without merit.'
solely for purposes of delay and directed the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of the City for frivolous appeal damages in the
amount of $288,582.78.148 Furthermore, the court of appeals imposed
monetary penalties against the County and its counsel under Georgia
Court of Appeals Rule 15(b)1 9 for filing a frivolous appeal."
In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Piedmont Construction Group,
LLC,'6 ' the insured, a general contractor, brought a third-party action
against its insurer for refusal to provide coverage or defend the insured
for fire damage caused to a building during renovation. The trial court

141. Id. at 334-35, 687 S.E.2d at 619-20.
142. Id. at 335-36, 687 S.E.2d at 620.
143. Id. at 333-34, 687 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Ferdinand v. City of East Point, 288 Ga.
App. 152, 159-60, 653 S.E.2d 529, 534-35 (2007)).
144. Id. at 336, 687 S.E.2d at 620.
145. Id. at 339, 687 S.E.2d at 622.
146. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Ferdinand,301 Ga. App. at 339, 687 S.E.2d at 623.
148. Id. at 339-40, 687 S.E.2d at 623.
149. GA. CT. ApP. R. 15(b).
150. Ferdinand,301 Ga. App. at 340, 687 S.E.2d at 623.
151. 301 Ga. App. 17, 686 S.E.2d 824 (2009).
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granted summary judgment to the insured."
The court of appeals
held that despite receiving an exhaustive opinion from the trial court
explaining every detail of its decision, the insurer proceeded to appeal
not only coverage but even its duty to defend the insured.'" The court
of appeals determined that the insurer relied solely on its "misreading
of a single Georgia decision" and held that the "appeal in the face of
controlling law ... justifie[d] the award of attorney fees [and frivolous
appeal penalties] under Court of Appeals Rule 15(b)."'

152. Id. at 17, 686 S.E.2d at 825-26.
153. Id. at 23, 686 S.E.2d at 829.
154. Id. at 23-24, 686 S.E.2d at 829.
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